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 1 Introduction  
Evaluation – both ex post and ex ante – is part of the Rio model of governance, 
which emerged from the UN Earth Summit of 1992. This chapter provides a gen-
eral overview of the Rio governance model that stands behind the strategic con-
cept of Sustainable Development. This model of environmental governance has 
been remarkably successful as a knowledge-based model of steering – not based 
on power and legal obligation. However, we urgently need further improvements. 
The chapter therefore makes a number of suggestions as to how to strengthen the 
Rio model of governance. It also looks at whether evaluation should use only a 
top-down perspective - the implementation of Agenda 21 or of national SD 
strategies – or should also adopt a bottom-up perspective focusing on forces that 
are independent from but supportive to the strategy of SD (e.g. high energy prices 
or changes in WTO rules).  
2 The Explosion of Complexity 
The Agenda 21 (or Rio) model of multi-level, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
governance is important because it is the only governance model that takes into 
account the extremely high complexity of the environmental field. There has 
been an “explosion” of complexity in the configuration of actors of environ-
mental governance since the early 1970s. Originally, the actor constellation of en-
vironmental policy was rather simple (Figure 1): Government regulated (or at least 
tried to regulate) the environmental behaviour of polluters through one-sided 
action (command and control). While there may have occasionally been some 
pressure from NGOs or the media or bilateral forms of co-operation between 
government and the target group, the actor constellation remained fairly simple 
compared with today. Now there is a new policy approach: Instead of restricting 
state intervention to “top-down” regulatory measures that are often limited to 
end-of-pipe treatment, modern environmental policy increasingly aims to inter-
nalise the solution of environmental problems into the polluting sectors. This is 
the core idea of “ecological modernisation” (Jänicke 1985, Mol 2001). The pollut-
ing sectors have the best information about both the problems they cause and the 
innovation potential they have. But they are themselves part of highly complex 
actor constellation that is being influenced at different levels - whether national, 
local or global. Also, civil society actors – NGOs, science organisations, the media 
– have increased the complexity of the actor constellation. They are not only local 
players but also influential at different levels. In addition, they do not only inter-
act with government actors but often establish a direct relationship with the 
business community that takes the form of both criticism and cooperation (Fig-
ure 2). 
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Fig. 1: Original Actor Constellation of Environmental Policy 
 National Government Industry 
















Source: Jänicke (2003) 
The “Rio Model” of Environmental Governance can be seen as an answer to this 
increasingly complex constellation of actors. It is explicitly characterised by:  
• Long-term goals, timeframes, monitoring and assessment (management by 
objectives) 
• Integration / sectoral strategies 
• Participation of stakeholders 
• Co-operation, activated self-regulation 
• Multi-level co-ordination. 
The “Agenda 21” (UNCED 1992) is the basic official document and describes not 
only the main objectives of sustainable development but also the main steering 
principles. The “Rio process” of implementing Agenda 21 forms a body of rich 
experience that is a valuable resource for further strategic learning on how to 
change the behaviour of actors under the described conditions of complexity. 
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3 Achievements of the “Rio Model” 
The governance model of Agenda 21 and the subsequent “Rio process” have 
achieved a certain degree of success. While National Strategies for Sustainable 
Development (NSSDs) now exist in most of the world’s countries, a total of 113 
countries had initiated  at least 6,400 local Agenda 21 processes as of 2002 (OECD 
/ UNDP 2002). There has also been a rapid diffusion of environmental policy in-
novations throughout the world since 1992 (see figure 3). More than 100 environ-
mental ministries have been established. Environmental NGOs have been 
strengthened at all policy levels. Some “greening” of sectoral policies (e.g. energy) 
has taken place. In the European Union, institutional innovations have integrated 
environmental considerations into the general policy process. Broad environ-
mental policy learning can be observed in companies, institutions and organisa-
tions. Some 90,500 companies worldwide have certified according to the ISO 
14001 scheme, with an increase of 37% in 2004 (Environment Daily, 27.Oct./2005). 
The knowledge base and the motivation of decentral actors have been strength-
ened. Multi-level environmental governance has been significantly improved, 
especially within the EU. 
Fig. 3: The Global Diffusion of Environmental Policy Innovations:  








































Source: Busch and Jörgens (2005) 
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4 Weaknesses of the “Rio Model” of Governance 
Despite undeniable achievements, one should not overlook that the “Rio Model” 
of governance also exhibits a number of shortcomings that need to be taken into 
account. The weaknesses become visible if we turn in the policy cycle from 
agenda setting and general policy formulation to implementation within and be-
tween countries. 
(a) As the Rio Model is essentially knowledge-based, the challenge is 
how to deal with power-based resistance  
The “Rio Model” of governance has been successful not as power-based mode of 
steering but as knowledge-based strategy focusing on innovation and policy 
learning. The Rio model of governance is therefore essentially a voluntary process 
of policy innovation, lesson-drawing and policy diffusion (Busch et al 2005). The 
most important implication was that small innovative countries like the Nether-
lands, Sweden or Denmark, rather than powerful countries like the US, have 
dominated the process. Never before have small countries played such an impor-
tant role in the development of global policy (Jänicke 2005).  
However, a purely knowledge-based approach has also a number of shortcom-
ings. Lack of clear responsibilities, for example, is a problem of an essentially vol-
untary mode of governance. Similarly, knowledge-based approaches often lack 
the institutional strength to guarantee successful implementation (see below). 
The main challenge, however, is to effectively deal with powerful resistance of 
highly organised interests. 
The knowledge-based mode of governance has often been able to successfully 
compete with the power-based approach. Nonetheless, it has also been restricted 
by power constellations: National governments and powerful industries have of-
ten resisted knowledge-induced change, especially in cases where vested sectoral 
interests were affected. Power has always the privilege to ignore and not to learn 
(Deutsch 1963). Powerful actors can be highly innovative and ready to learn. But 
the pressure to do so is lower compared with actors that do not have much power 
at their disposal. Here, the lesson for evaluation may be to consider possible op-
tions of overcoming resistance not only through soft modes of sectoral “transi-
tions management” but also through countervailing pressure for environmental 
innovation and sustainable policy objectives (Table 1).  
Multi-level governance can provide several opportunities to exert pressure (to 
learn) against resistant polluters. The Brent Spar conflict has been a prominent 
example for a certain kind of pressure. But there are many other possibilities. 
Powerful actors may act as veto-players but they are also subject to different pres-
sures for innovation. The pressure for environment-friendly innovation can be 
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caused by a large variety of different factors that include price explosions, new 
technologies or news headlines. Given the highly complex actor constellation of 
global environmental governance, this pressure can be exerted from below, or 
from above, or from different sides. It can originate from competitors as well as 
from pioneer countries that set regulatory trends (see figure 2). Horizontal pres-
sure through political and/or technological competition is especially interesting 
in this context. This is the mechanism where even powerful veto-players like the 
US government are in a relatively weak position.  
Tab. 1: Pressure for Environmental Innovation - the Complexity of Economic 
Risks for Polluters 
Economic Factors: 
• Volatile energy prices 
• Volatile prices of certain raw materials 
• “Green” demand from retailers 
• “Green” demand within the supply chain  
• Competing new technologies (pressure for substitution) 
• Insurances 
• Benchmarking systems 
• EMS Certification of competitors (EMAS, ISO 14.001)  
Political Factors: 
• Activities of pioneer countries  
• Strict regulation of important markets (e. g. EU) 
• Regulatory trends  
• International environmental regimes  
• Public procurement.  
Societal Factors: 
• Attacks from green NGOs (e.g. Brent Spar) 
• Media campaigns against polluters 
• Alarming media reports 
• Internet campaigns against polluters  
• Alarming scientific studies  
• “Green” consumerism of the growing global middle class. 
Source: Own compilation 
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(b)  There is a need to reinvent government in the context of 
governance for sustainable development. 
Co-operative and self-regulatory approaches are indispensable, especially if the 
solution of problems is to be internalised into the responsible sectors. But this 
co-operative mode of steering often needs the final responsibility and capacity of 
governments: 
1. Elected governments have a higher institutional responsibility. Unlike private 
actors, they are not free to ignore a given problem.  
2. Regulatory and legal approaches are still the dominant form of policy-
making, at least in environmental policy (RIVM 2004). And so far they have 
proven comparatively effective. Regulatory and legal approaches need how-
ever more flexibility and goal orientation and should therefore be comple-
mented by economic instruments.  
3. There is currently a great degree of innovation in government intervention – 
innovation that consists mainly of new instruments combining regulation 
with high flexibility: While emission trading combines hard administrative 
caps with flexible responses, the Japanese “top-runner” programme makes 
energy efficiency of the “top runner” (the one that achieves the highest energy 
efficiency out of a total of 18 products) the basis of the standard. Obligatory 
feed-in tariffs for power from renewable energy are another example of this 
kind of flexible regulation.  
(c) There is a need to re-invent the nation state in the context of 
multi-level governance. 
Compared with other actors, the nation state (at least the OECD-type) is best 
equipped to take the final responsibility within the complex structure of global 
multi-level governance: 
1. The nation state  has the highest political visibility and, as a rule, it is the first 
redress in case of crises.  
2. The media and public opinion are most developed at the level of the nation 
state. It is therefore at the national level where the pressure for political le-
gitimation is highest.  
3. The manpower of the nation state is high compared with the staff of interna-
tional regimes: While the US Environmental Protection Agency has about  
18,000 employees, the staff of international environmental regimes usually 
does not exceed a few hundred employees.  
4. The professional competence of the national administrations being compara-
bly high, government administrations play an important role in international 
expert networks.  
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5. The national monopoly of violence is still a very important political resource.  
6. National regulatory innovation and its diffusion is an important determinant 
of global markets: policy-dependent national lead markets play an important 
role in the ecological modernisation of global markets and international 
competition, not least the competition in markets for eco-efficient technolo-
gies (Jacob et al. 2005).  
7. Finally, globalisation has created a policy arena for pioneer countries (Jänicke 
2005). Germany, UK, Japan, Finland and Sweden claim to be “pioneers” in en-
vironmental policy. This type of political competition and “benchmarking” is 
a by-product of the Rio process. 
(d) Capacity needs assessment: Ambitious strategies need adequate 
capacities  
“Capacity” can be defined by the limits of possible action within a given political, 
economic and informational opportunity structure. A general lack of institutional 
authority and manpower as well as  of knowledge or economic and technological 
resources has been the norm in the Rio process. There seems to be a contradic-
tion between the ambitious objectives of sustainability and the generally ac-
knowledged objective of ‘lean’ government. However, capacity-building (more 
manpower, larger institutions, more knowledge) is not the only possible answer 
to this challenge. There are also the possible options of:  
• Demand reduction: This strategy involves prioritisation and focus on the 
main unsolved problems rather than holistic mega strategies, 
• Capacity saving strategies, e.g. through Internet consultations instead of real 
(physical) participation, or negotiation under the threat of regulation (“in the 
shadow of hierarchy”),  
• Policy termination (to the extent possible): Where problems have been solved 
permanently, policies should be terminated in order to save scarce capacities. 
A capacity needs assessment should therefore be the first step of any strategy. 
(e) The environmental dimension of Sustainable Development 
should not be restricted by the three-pillar-approach.  
The “environmental dimension” – together with economic development – has 
originally been the most important dimension of SD. The triple bottom-line has 
been invented after the Rio summit. The environmental dimension has its own 
goals, problems and interests, alongside those of the economic and social pillars. 
Also, it has its own specific support structure (NGOs etc.). The “three pillar ap-
proach” as such has no societal support base. The environmental dimension as 
well as its economic counterpart need their own expertise and specialisation 
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since holistic approaches that are too general create the danger of amateurism. It 
is weakest if there is conditionality between the three dimensions. The antago-
nisms between the three pillars are a reality and need pro-active, open conflict 
resolution by competent proponents in an inclusive network. The tendency of 
“negative coordination” inherent in the three-pillar approach (environment pol-
icy introduced only if economic or social interests are not negatively affected) 
should be overcome. Only positive coordination makes sense (win-win, search for 
synergies). Therefore, a minimum of autonomy and specialisation of the envi-
ronmental dimension is necessary. 
(f) National SD Strategies should be both, problem-orientated and 
innovation-oriented  
The Rio Model of Governance incorporates National Strategies for Sustainable 
Development (NSSD) as a key requirement of Agenda 21. However, it is necessary 
to note the main weaknesses and strengths of existing NSSDs. Only 12% of a total 
of 191 countries have strategies that are now being implemented. Another 24% 
have strategy documents that have been approved by governments (OECD 2005). 
There is a consensus among experts that lack of political leadership as well as 
insufficient institutionalisation, capacity-building, policy integration, target set-
ting and monitoring are generally observed weaknesses of national SD strategies 
(Swanson et al. 2004, OECD / UNDP 2002). These factors help explain the low de-
gree of effective implementation. The above mentioned restrictive and often con-
fusing understanding of the “three pillar approach” of SD may be added as a fur-
ther explanation. 
One further weakness of NSSDs, which has so far not been addressed, can be 
added. There is often a lack of problem-orientation on the one hand, and innova-
tion-orientation on the other hand. Many NSSDs give too many answers without 
asking the right questions. And the answers often underestimate the market po-
tential of innovative solutions. The environmental dimension is generally dis-
cussed with a focus on measures, i.e. on instruments, projects, and best practice. 
The most urgent environmental problems, which should be at the core of such 
strategies, are often forgotten or substituted by “visions” of all kinds. The initial 
step, therefore, should be a diagnosis of the most important unsolved problems. 
For example, if higher energy taxes or other additional costs are proposed, the 
underlying problems should be communicated to and accepted by those who are 
due to pay. In terms of the “multiple-stream” theory (Zahariadis 1999), the policy 
stream of NSSD proposals should converge not only with the political stream (of 
political opportunities) but also with the problem stream, which has its own ex-
pertise and actor constellation.  
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The counter argument is that too much focus on problems (“alarmism”) will de-
ter the public. This, indeed, may also be true, even if we concede that political 
mobilisation is an essentially problem-oriented process. The solution may be to 
“balance” the bad news by good news about possible options and best practice. 
For instance, the general public must be familiar with the prognosis of climate 
change and the probable damage effects. But it will tend to suppress the bad news 
if there is no positive perspective of innovation (new markets for renewables, re-
duced costs by higher energy efficiency etc.). The problem-oriented approach, 
therefore, should be systematically connected with an innovation-oriented per-
spective of eco-efficiency and ecological modernisation (Jänicke 1985, Mol 2001).  
This is a normative proposal but it is based on comparative evaluation. The most 
successful NSSDs are those that rely strongly on innovation. This is exactly the 
kind of solution that has been adopted by countries claiming to be pioneers in 
environmental policy – Sweden, Finland, Germany, UK, the Netherlands, Japan, 
and South Korea. The first steps to integrate the concept of eco-efficiency into the 
EU Lisbon strategy may also be mentioned in this context. The EU spring sum-
mit has explicitly declared that „the development of eco-innovation and eco-
technology as well as the sustainable management of natural resources“ should be 
part of the EU strategy for growth and employment (Council of the European Un-
ion: Presidency Conclusions, 23 March 2005, 5).  
Marketable environmental innovations are characterised by two facts. They relate 
to global environmental needs and consequently to potential global markets. And 
they can lead to economic advantages such as reduced costs (including the costs 
of environmental protection) through more sustainable low-impact technologies. 
This may be the most important explanation for the fact that national environ-
mental policy (contrary to other policies) has not suffered so much from a regula-
tory downward competition (“race to the bottom”). On the contrary, the environ-
mental issue has to a certain degree become a dimension of the competition for 
innovation between the highly developed countries. There is a high correlation 
between a stricter environmental policy and the competitiveness of a country 
(Jänicke 2005).  
5 Ex-ante and Ex-post Evaluation 
Evaluation is an essential part of the Rio model of governance. It follows the soft, 
knowledge-based mode of steering. Evaluation can take place ex post and ex-ante 
(see Figure 4).  
The ex-ante evaluation and assessment of the legal and constitutional implica-
tions of proposed laws, for instance, is a routine procedure in many countries 
across the world. In addition, there has always been a general public debate and 
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quasi-evaluation of legal proposals. Also, the assessment of budgetary require-
ments and cost-benefit analyses of proposed policies are already well-known tools 
(Howlett / Ramesh 2003). Environmental impact assessment of policies, plans and 
projects is a more recent approach. Following the logic of the Rio model of gov-
ernance, it is a soft ex-ante steering mechanism of policy learning within the 
process of policy formulation. Integrated impact assessment is the most ambi-
tious but also the most difficult policy innovation in this field.  
Environmental impact assessment should, indeed, be (and often already is) part of 
the routine of ex-ante assessment. But it should not be overestimated. Its impact 
depends on certain conditions which may lead either to mainstreaming or “side-
lining” of environmental considerations. Again, some autonomy of the environ-
mental dimension must be secured and the conflict between the three different 
perspectives of SD evaluation must be solved in open, transparent and pluralistic 
discussions. Check lists of relevant environmental risks must be well known and 
easy to handle if environmental impact assessment is to become an effective tool 
of governance.  

















Source: Jänicke 2005 
Ex-post evaluation, following the implementation phase of the “policy cycle”, has 
a long tradition (Howlett / Ramesh 2003). Here, a distinction has to be made be-
tween “top-down” and “bottom up” approaches to evaluation. In the first case, the 
evaluation takes a given programme and its objectives as a starting point, e.g. a 
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national SD strategy and its targets. Here, the main question is in how far and at 
what cost the objectives have been achieved. The bottom-up approach, on the 
other hand, takes real changes as a starting point, regardless of whether the SD 
policy or other influencing factors were the main causes of the observed change. 
Oil prices, for instance, may sometimes be a more important influencing factor 
than the existing clean air or climate policy. Similarly, an environmental im-
provement can be primarily due to a structural change in the economy. The 
greening of agriculture, for example, may not primarily be the result of an envi-
ronmental sector strategy or the EU Cardiff process but rather the outcome of 
new WTO rules on subsidies. 
Influencing factors that are not directly related to a given NSSD area of high (en-
vironmental) importance. They originate within the mainstream of the process of 
political and economic development and often go far beyond any environmental 
strategy. There are more causal factors than the NSSD itself and many positive 
outcomes cannot be explained with strategy alone, which plays only a rather mar-
ginal role as long as it is not integrated into the policy mainstream. One may feel 
more comfortable with bottom-up evaluation approach because the results tend 
to be more positive. Taking the Kyoto Protocol as an example, a top down per-
spective will show slow implementation and heavy resistance of several countries, 
whereas a bottom up perspective will reveal the booming market of renewables, 
the crisis of the sport utility vehicle (SUV) market, and the rapid diffusion of en-
ergy-efficiency policies etc. (Tews / Jänicke 2005). At the same time, however, a 
top-down evaluation of target outcomes may reveal that - despite these achieve-
ments - the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continues to 
rise. Therefore, both perspectives are necessary and complementary. 
Top-down analysis is indispensable because we want to know what the outcomes 
of a specific policy are. But the causal factors that produce improvements “free of 
charge” should not be ignored. This is important for a number of reasons. First of 
all, the fact that environmental problems have their proper dynamics and can 
create special policy windows has not only stimulated the Rio process and its 
agenda of SD but also continues to shape its implementation. The case of climate 
protection, for example, shows that the dynamics underlying the market success 
of technological innovation can have a stronger impact than the existing NSSDs 
themselves. Secondly. the actor constellation influencing environmental im-
provements is much more complex than the actor constellation underlying a SD 
strategy, which is too often the sole activity of a specifically designated and insti-
tutionalised “epistemic community”. Here, we first have to consider the effects of 
knowledge-based policy learning under the conditions of exploding complexity 
(as mentioned above). Also, we need to take into account the effects of potential 
pressure for environmental innovation. which has become similarly complex and 
creates insecurity for polluters since it arises at different levels and is exercised by 
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different actors ranging from governments and competitors to societal actors (see 
table 1).  
These are fundamental issues in strategic level evaluation, which is rarely suffi-
ciently precise to be able to measure the extent to which each of many possible 
causes can be ascribed to an observed effect. In such circumstances, the ex-post 
and top-down evaluation of any particular strategic intervention may not be suffi-
cient for a full understanding of policy learning. We may instead require broader 
research into the validity of the theoretical foundations on which the full set of 
policies is based. The main aim of ex-post evaluation remains to identify whether 
the desired outcomes are being achieved, and if not, whatever the specific causes, 
to identify appropriate corrective actions. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Global environmental governance is necessarily multi-actor, multi-sectoral and 
multi-level. The Rio model of governance has so far provided an adequate answer. 
It is the only model that takes into account the highly complex actor configura-
tion. A reform could therefore remain essentially “path-dependent”. However, a 
general evaluation of this ambitious strategic concept and its weaknesses leads to 
the following policy recommendations: 
• The role of government in the context of cooperative governance should be 
recognized and strengthened. 
• The nation state is indispensable and has regained importance in the context 
of multi-level governance. 
• The restrictive understanding of the “three pillar approach” to SD tends to 
dwarf the environmental dimension and should be overcome: A certain 
autonomy of the environmental dimension seems indispensable. 
• The design of ambitious NSSDs as well as their implementation and evalua-
tion generally need to solve capacity problems. There are, however, more op-
tions than the increase of capacity – an ambition that is often in contradiction 
with policies in favour of lean government. Alternatives to capacity-building 
include demand-reduction through prioritisation and sequencing and capac-
ity-saving strategies (e.g. Internet consultations). 
• NSSDs should be problem-oriented, but not “alarmist”. Instead, the long-
term problems should be related to the existing potential of innovation and 
ecological modernisation. 
• The tool of bottom-up evaluation draws our attention to the fact that there 
are more possible causes of environmental improvements than the NSSD 
itself.  
• The actor constellation that exercises influence on the progress towards SD is 
by no means confined to the actors responsible for implementation of the 
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NSSD. Also, the pressure for environment-related innovation has many 
sources that go far beyond the existing NSSD strategy: In the highly complex 
actor constellation of global environmental governance, this pressure can be 
exerted from below or from above, or – horizontally – from different sides. It 
can originate from competitors as well as from trendsetters of environmental 
regulation. NSSDs should therefore target as much as possible the relevant 
polluters and anchor the policy interventions in “their” field of action. 
The last point shows that there is a high potential for progress towards global 
environmental governance if these challenges and opportunities are taken up and 
lead to better-designed policy solutions. 
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